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REGULATION OF BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH IN THE TERRORISM ERA
Barry Kellmant
I. INTRODUCTION
Perhaps no discipline has made (and continues to make) such a
profound contribution to humanity as biological science. Unques-
tionably, the pace and significance of that contribution has steadily
accelerated, all the more so in recent years. Most experts believe that
revolutionary leaps are yet to come but not far off. Not to be over-
looked is that this progress has come with nary a "dark side" - Cas-
sandra prophecies of rampaging mutants have, as yet, not material-
ized.
A widely-held view within the biological community is that pro-
gress is a function of minimal government regulation. Indeed, there is
an apparent correlation between the pace of scientific discovery and
the freedom of scientists to pursue ideas according to their own ex-
perience and creativity without bureaucratic intrusion; whether there a
causal relationship or mere coincidence is debatable.
It is reasonable to ask, therefore, why policy makers are insisting
on greater control over biological science. The answer has to do with
terrorism and proliferation, of course, but that answer disguises more
than it illuminates. Sophisticated and malevolent groups can use bio-
logical means to draw attention to their misconceived political objec-
tives, but this potentiality is not dependent on leading edge research.
Making a biological weapon is not trivial, but neither does it demand
the dedicated services of the discipline's elites. The argument for
regulating biological research in order to prevent biological terrorism
is somewhat simplistic.
A subtler, and better, answer focuses on three concerns of the re-
lationship between biological research and bio-terrorism. First and
most obvious, while terrorists of exceptional training and resources
might be able to make and disseminate a biological weapon, the diffi-
culties of doing so may be substantially reduced with ready access to
t Professor Barry Kellman is Director of the International Weapons Control
Center at DePaul University College of Law.
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unique and highly refined pathogens, to advanced equipment, and to
innovative procedures. Second and somewhat related is that while
making a crude weapon may be pedestrian, biological research is in-
creasingly raising possibilities that an individual or small group could
develop a disease of such devastation that civilization itself would be
fundamentally maimed with attendant risks of economic collapse and
political upheaval. Third and quite distinct is biological research of-
fers the potential to uncover the underlying principles of pathogenicity
and develop vaccines and other protective measures against a bio-
terrorist event; would the net gain would be greater in suppressing
information that might conceivably be used malevolently, of in dis-
seminating that information to allow legitimate research into underly-
ing biological phenomenon.'
Two unrelated events since Sept. 1 1 th have brought these concerns
into sharper relief. First were the anthrax-laden mailings to various
political leaders. Although anthrax is readily available in nature, this
powder was extraordinarily refined, suggesting that its production was
the work of a remarkably advanced laboratory process. Second was
the re-creation of the polio virus in a laboratory (discussed infra). A
crippling disease that has been thought to be eradicated from most of
the world and due to be extinguished has suddenly re-arisen, not by
natural outbreak, but by scientists' intentional design.
These events have provoked various political initiatives, three of
which are the subject of this discussion. First, under the recently en-
acted Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Re-
sponse Act, the scope of regulatory oversight of pathogens has been
substantially expanded from what earlier law had provided. Second,
an initiative is currently under consideration to shift critical elements
of biological regulation from the Department of Health and Human
Services to the to-be-formed Department of Homeland Security, sug-
gesting a shift of regulatory emphasis from the promotion of social
welfare to the protection of national security. Third, new regulations
from various agencies are raising a specter of governmental restraint
on the free dissemination of knowledge in the biological sciences.
1 See Freedom ofInformation, 8 NATURE MED. 899 (Sept. 2002) (advocat-
ing why scientific data, some possibly useful to bioterrorists, should not be restricted
in publication by legislation), available at http://www.nature.com/cgi-
taf/DynaPage.taffile=/nm/journal/v8/n9/index.html (arguing the need for restraint by
the government when applying information restrictions).
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II. REGULATORY OVERSIGHT OF PATHOGENS
As recently as 1995, few legal restrictions applied to domestic
transfers of lethal pathogens. The experience of Larry Wayne Harris
as well as rising fears of terrorist access to biological weapons precur-
sors provoked passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act in 1996.2 The Act authorized the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC) to regulate transfers of pathogens of unique interest in terms of
their capacity to be used as weapons (the select agents list).3 Accord-
ingly, the CDC required that laboratories transferring select agents be
registered; a registered laboratory could legally transfer select agents
only to another registered laboratory; transfers to non-registered labo-
ratories were prohibited. Registration under that Act, however, was
principally a matter of notification: a laboratory was obligated to no-
tify relevant authorities of a transfer to another registered facility and
that the transfer itself complied with applicable safety standards. Spe-
cific information about particular pathogens that the facility possessed
did not have to be reported, not even if they were the subjects of ex-
tensive research, so long as they were not transferred. This was not
intended to be a strict licensing system but merely a way of oversee-
ing the traffic (slight though it may be) in lethal pathogens.
Although it is still not known (as of this writing) whether a do-
mestic laboratory was the source of the deadly anthrax attacks in
2001, a burgeoning concern over the risks associated with biological
terrorism led to enactment of the Public Health Security and Bioter-
rorism Preparedness Response Act.4 The "Act authorizes $1.6 billion
to implement state plans and conduct additional preparedness activi-
ties, [and it] addresses other related public health security issues [such
as] additional safety and security measures affecting the nation's food
and drug supply, additional safety and security measures affecting the
nation's drinking water, [and] measures affecting the Strategic Na-
tional Stockpile and development of priority countermeasures to
bioterrorism."5
2 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
32, 110 Stat. 1214, 1284-85 (1996). For a discussion of the events concerning Larry
Wayne Harris and the legislative changes that those events engendered, see generally
Barry Kellman, Biological Terrorism: Legal Measures for Preventing Catastrophe,
24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 417, 446-57 (2001) (explaining the Larry Wayne Ham's
incident and its effects on federal regulation of pathogens).
3 See generally Interstate Shipment of Etiologic Agents, 42 C.F.R. § 72 app.
A (2001) (listing forty-two biological agents and toxins).
4 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-88, 116 Stat. 594 (2002).
5 See The Public Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
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A. Enhanced Reporting Obligations
Title II of the new Act, Enhanced Controls of Dangerous Biologi-
cal Agents & Toxins, substantially broadens the regulatory obligations
for laboratories working with select agents. Indeed, its objective far
exceeds oversight of the movements of pathogens; its objective is to
establish a national database for dangerous pathogens and to monitor
their distribution and use.
The new law requires any entity possessing select pathogens6 to
report to the Secretary of HHS the names and locations of relevant
facilities, the select agents they possess, use or transfer, and informa-
tion about the characteristics of the select agents.7 Approximately
190,000 research and diagnostic laboratories, scientists and manufac-
turers must notify federal authorities whether they have any of 36
listed pathogens that can be used to make biological weapons or com-
ponents of them that control virulence or toxicity. The new legislation
also authorizes the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) to develop
a list of agriculturally significant biological agents and toxins and,
consistent and cooperatively with the HHS, regulate possession, use
or transfer of listed biological agents and toxins that threaten plant or
animal health or their products.8 It is expected that the USDA will
soon add 24 more livestock diseases and possibly more plant patho-
gens as potential sources for biological weapons. 9
of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-88) Overview of Grants for States and Local Governments,
at http://www.ncsi.org/statefed/health/pl107-188overview.htm (last visited Nov. 1,
2002) (providing a complete listing of grant information and eligibility under the
Act).
6 Under the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Re-
sponse Act of 2002, the Secretary must establish and "maintain a list [which may be
updated when necessary] of each biological agent and toxin that has the potential to
pose a sever threat to public health and safety." The Public Health Security and
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-88, §
351A(a)(1)(A), 116 Stat. 594, 637 (2002). In deciding which agents or toxins shall be
included, the Secretary must consider:
(1) the effect on human health of exposure to the agent or toxin;
(11) the degree of contagiousness of the agent or toxin and the method by
which it is transferred to humans;
(IIl) the availability and effectiveness of pharmacotherapies and immuniza-
tions to treat and prevent illness resulting from the infection; and
(IV) any other criteria including the needs of children and other vulnerable
populations. The list may be updated when necessary.
Id. at § 351A(a)(1)(B)(i)(I)-(IV).
I ld. at § 351A(d).
8 Id. at § 212.
9 Diana Jean Schemo, Sept. 11 Strikes at Labs' Doors, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2002, at Fl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/13/science/13RESE.html.
[Vol. 13:159
REGULATION OF BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Under the new laws, only researchers with a "legitimate need"
may have access to the materials, which will be barred to students or
researchers from countries considered sponsors of terrorism and to
people with felony or drug convictions or with histories of mental
illness.' ° The necessary implication is that unreported possession of
select agents is an offense and punishable by up to five years impris-
onment' 1
The obligation to report applies from 90 days following enactment
of the bill based on guidance issued by the Secretary within 30 days of
enactment and the issuance of a final rule with requirements for regis-
tration of facilities in 180 days of enactment; the final rule will take
effect after 60 days of the final rule.'
2
Because innocent breach of this obligation is not a defense, every
laboratory must scour through its freezers and other storage sites for
such items lest they materialize unexpectedly. For many laboratories,
notably associated with universities, collections of pathogens are im-
properly labeled, complicating the task of conducting a complete in-
ventory. Even those laboratories that are not working with one of the
agents or toxins on the list have to file a notification to the Secretary.3
This alone signifies a substantial regulatory change for facilities en-
gaged in biological research: before the new act, only a conscious
decision to transfer a select agent provoked a regulatory obligation;
now, obligations apply to every research facility without regard to any
current choice to engage in regulated activity.
Even clinical or diagnostic laboratory that might come into pos-
session of a select pathogen temporarily only in order for specimen
diagnosis, verification or proficiency testing must report that item
unless it promptly either destroys the sample on site or transfers it to a
registered facility.14 Congress explicitly rejected any broad exclusion
10 The Public Health, Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-88, § 351A(e)(2), 116 Stat. 594, 642 (2002).
" Id. at § 231.
12 Id. at §§ 202(a)-(b).
13 Notice of OMB Approval of Data Collection, 67 Fed. Reg. 51058 (Aug. 6,
2002), available at http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/selectagent8602.pdf. The CDC
explains, "Asking respondents to declare non-possession is a critical means of ensur-
ing that DHHS is knowledgeable of the potential universe of possessors of regulated
agents and is necessary in order to effectively carry out the statutory intent of respon-
sibly governing the transfer, possession, and use of biological agents or toxins."
14 AM. SOC'Y FOR MICROBIOLOGY, CONGRESS PASSES PUBLIC HEALTH
SECURITY AND BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS ACT/EXPANDS CONTROLS OVER SELECT
AGENTS, at http://www.asuma.org/pasrc/hr3448algrt.htm (last modified May 31,
2002) (explaining the legislation that provides for new programs and authorities to
increase the preparedness and response capability of the U.S. public health system for
bioterrorist attack or public health emergency).
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of these facilities. 15 The Secretary may, in his/her discretion, exempt
products that are used in investigational or clinical trials authorized
under federal laws, with attention to the time sensitivity of such tri-
als. 1
6
B. Enhanced Safety and Security
The Secretary must also provide for the establishment and en-
forcement of safety procedures, including: (1) proper training and
appropriate skills to handle such agents and toxins; (2) proper labora-
tory facilities to contain and dispose of such agents and toxins; (3)
measures to prevent access to such agents and toxins for use in do-
mestic or international terrorism or for any criminal purpose; (4) pro-
cedures to protect the public safety in the event of a violation of the
safety or security measures; and (5) appropriate availability of bio-
logical agents and toxins for research, education, and other legitimate
purposes.' 7 The Secretary may inspect facilities subject to regulations
to ensure their compliance with such regulations, including prohibi-
tions on restricted persons.
The Secretary and appropriate federal, state and local law en-
forcement agencies must be promptly notified in the event of a theft or
loss of listed agents and toxins or in the event of a release of agents
outside the proper bio-containment area. If the Secretary finds that
the release poses a threat to public health or safety, s/he must take
appropriate action to notify authorized emergency response authori-
ties. On an annual basis, the Secretary will report to Congress the
15 H.R. REP. No. 107-481, at 122 (2002). See Notice of OMB Approval of
Data Collection, 67 Fed. Reg. 51058 (Aug. 6, 2002) ("Congress permits exemption of
such clinical and diagnostic laboratories from registration requirements, '. . . only if
they report the identification of select agents to the Secretary and either promptly
transfer the agent to a registered person or destroy the agent on site in accordance
with regulations established by the Secretary"' ).
16 Exemptions are provided consistent with the current select agent transfer
rule for products that are or contain select agents and are approved under specific
federal laws unless the Secretary determines that additional regulation is necessary for
a specific product to ensure protection to public health and safety. The legislation
mandates a prompt determination by the Secretary of an exemption within 14 days
after the applicant has submitted a complete exemption request and has notified the
Secretary that the investigation may proceed as authorized under federal law. The
Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-88, § 351(A), 116 Stat. 594, 642 (2002).
17 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-88 § 351A(j)-(k), 116 Stat. 594, 645 (2002) (requiring
the notification and reporting of any loss or theft of listed agents or toxin).
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number and nature of notifications received relating to theft or loss
and to releases.' s
C. Enhanced Restrictions on Access
Entities having registered facilities must limit access to select
agents; only persons that the entity determines to have a legitimate
need to handle or use select agents may have access. An even more
overt imposition of law enforcement concerns is the Act's require-
ment that the entity submit such individuals' names to the HHS and
the Attorney General who will check relevant criminal, immigration,
national security and other electronic databases as to whether the indi-
vidual is a restricted person as defined in section 175b of Title 18 of
the US Code or is reasonably suspected by any federal law enforce-
ment or intelligence agency of committing a crime, knowing involve-
ment with domestic or international terrorism or crime, or being an
agent of a foreign power. 19 The Attorney General must promptly no-
tify the HHS Secretary who, in turn, must notify the entity about
whether an individual is granted or denied access. Denial of access
privileges may be appealed pursuant to a stipulated review process
that includes provisions to ensure that classified or sensitive law en-
forcement information is not compromised during those reviews.
D. Regulation of Information
The Secretary must maintain a national database that includes the
names and locations of registered persons, the listed agents and toxins
such persons are possessing, using, or transferring, and information
regarding the characterization of such agents and toxins. The Attor-
ney General will have access to the database.2°
Nondisclosure obligations apply to reported information concern-
ing
(1) [T]he possession, use, or transfer of a listed agent;
18 See The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Re-
sponse Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-88 § 201(k) Reports, available at
http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/p 1I07188.pdf.
19 ??? Section 175b was enacted on 26 October 2001 in the Patriot Act (PL
107-56) and prohibits restricted persons from possessing, using or transferring select
agents and includes individuals with criminal felony records, fugitives from justice,
aliens illegally in the United States, foreign nationals from terrorism-sponsoring na-
tions, individuals dishonorably discharged from the Armed Services, and individuals
adjudicated as mentally defective.
20 The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-88 §§ 201(d)-(e), 116 Stat. 594, 639 (2002).
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(2) [t]he national database;
(3) safeguard and security measures.., to prevent unauthor-
ized access;
(4) notification of any release, theft or loss of a listed agent,
(5) an inspection of a registered facility.21
All relevant federal agencies and departments are bound by the
nondisclosure obligation.
III. OVERSIGHT OF BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
Of different but no less impact to the conduct of biological activi-
ties is the question of what government authority is responsible for
oversight. Arguably, the favored answer here among many in the
biological community is "none of the above." That option being po-
litically unacceptable, however, most of that community has a distinct
preference to be regulated by agencies that share its fundamental ob-
jectives and philosophy. For many years, regulation of biological
activities has been within the domain of the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS); regulation of especially dangerous pathogens
has been within the domain of the CDC which itself is within HHS'
domain. A certain comfort level has been established both because of
long familiarity and because HHS' mission is to promote health - a
mission that is obviously in accord with the work of most biological
scientists.
Precisely because of this mission, HHS is ill-suited to be the fed-
eral agency primarily responsible for preventing terrorist misuse of
biological agents. That is primarily a national security or law en-
forcement function. Its principal motifs entail circumscribing unfet-
tered freedom of action in certain spheres while increasing the gov-
ernment's access to and control of information - motifs that are sub-
stantially at odds with a mission of promoting basic scientific research
to the goal of improving human health and welfare. To address this
mismatch, it may be appropriate either to transfer some of HHS' re-
sponsibilities to a different department that is better suited to pursue
national security or to authorize such a department to establish na-
tional priorities and policies while leaving HHS to implement those
policies.
In this context, the President's proposal for a Department of
Homeland Security has raised a troubling issue for the biological
community. It is not that the creation of this new federal authority is
viewed as unnecessary or inappropriate; concerns have arisen as to the
2 Id. at §§ 351A(h)(1)(A)-(E).
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transfer of responsibilities from Health and Human Services to the
Department of Homeland Security. Under current law, The CDC and
the National Institutes of Health (NIH), both part of HHS, now admin-
ister most biodefense programs, including support for state and local
public health preparedness and research on threats to human health.22
Under the new proposal, for some public health and medical activities,
"DHS would assume [direct] responsibility; [for other activities,]
DHS would [be] responsible for setting goals and providing strategic
direction but would rely upon HHS to implement and operate the ac-
tivities on a day-to-day basis. 23
Given that the new Department will have important intelligence,
threat, and vulnerability-related information necessary for the identifi-
cation of program priorities, it has been argued that the new Depart-
ment should develop our national strategic plan for bioterrorism ac-
tivities and identify our most urgent national priorities, including pri-
orities for programs at HHS.24 Some of the functions that the Presi-
dent proposes be transferred to DHS include: oversight of select
agents and enforcement of controls, responsibilities relating to emer-
gency preparedness and response, and oversight of biological re-
search. This proposal has generated concerns that transferring
bioterrorism preparedness planning and research to the new depart-
ment would undermine efforts to strengthen the public health sys-
tem.26
A. Select Agent Registration and Enforcement Program
As discussed above, the recently enacted Public Health Security
and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act has authorized HHS
to promulgate and enforce regulations concerning the possession,
22 See Robert Ross, House Panel backs keeping HHS in charge of bioterror-
ism preparedness, Center for Infectious Disease Research & Policy (July 22, 2002)
(explaining new legislative approach to organizing bioterrorism preparation), at
http://www I .umn.edu/cidrap/content/bt/bioprep/news/index.html.
23 DHHS and the Dep 't of Homeland Security before the House Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, (June 25, 2002)
(statement of Claude A. Allen, Deputy Secretary, Dep't of Health and Human Ser-
vices).
24 Testimony of Congressman W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, Chairman of Committee
on Energy and Commerce, Before the Select Comm. on Homeland Security, (July 17,
2002), at http://hsc.house.gov/docs/0717/tauzin.asp.
25 Allen, supra note 23.
26 See Am. Soc'y for Microbiology, ASM Outlines Concerns Raised by Bio-
defense Research Amendment to the National Homeland Security and Combating
Terrorism Act of 2002, S. 2452, at http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/liebermanltr.htm
(July 30, 2002).
2003]
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transfer and use of select agents. From the perspective of averting the
threat of misuse of those agents by terrorists, the HHS and the CDC
are arguably not designed to exercise the level of oversight that might
be appropriate to the objective of preventing malevolent use of lethal
pathogens. Accordingly, the President's bill proposes to transfer to
the Secretary of Homeland Security the responsibility to administer
the select agents program z7 with the HHS Secretary in a consultative
role: HHS will provide DHS with scientific expertise and other tech-
nical assistance and make key medical and scientific decisions.28
B. Emergency Preparedness and Response
1. The Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness
Among its many initiatives, the 2002 Bioterrorism Act created the
HHS Office of the Assistant Secretary for Public Health Emergency
Preparedness with responsibility for supervising the Office of Emer-
gency Preparedness, the National Disaster Medical System, the Met-
ropolitan Medical Response Systems, and related HHS emergency
management functions.2 9 This office was designed and intended to
serve as the central coordinator of consequence management activities
in the event of a biological attack or act of bio-terrorism. In such an
event, it will be imperative to mobilize substantial medical resources,
most likely involving specialized expertise. It may also be necessary
to exercise special authority with regard to issues such as comman-
deering of private resources and implementation of quarantines. The
question arises as to whether this is a "public health" function or a
"national security" function.
In proposing the establishment of the DHS, the Administration as-
serted that, on balance, it would be preferable to maintain a "seamless
integration of national public health and medical emergency manage-
ment assets with the Nation's new preparedness and response infra-
structure at DHS.,, 30 This proposal was not submitted critically of
HHS but to reflect the need for coordination among diverse conse-
quence management responsibilities.
31
27 Analysis for the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Title III Chemical, Bio-
logical, Radiological, and Nuclear Countermeasures § 302 Functions Transferred, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/analysis/index.html.
28 Allen, supra note 23.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id.
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2. Certain Public Health-Related Activities
The President's proposal provides that the new Department shall -
unless otherwise directed by the President - carry out through HHS
certain public health related activities (such as programs to enhance
the bioterrorism preparedness of state and local governments and non-
federal public and private health care facilities and providers).32 The
object of this provision is to continue the HHS' role in assisting state
and local governments and the hospital and public health community
in preparing for and responding to large scale public health emergen-
cies. 33 "As with the research program, the Secretary of [DHS,] in
consultation with the Secretary of [HHS], will establish the Nation's
anti-terrorism preparedness and response program and priorities, but
implementation of the public health components of that program will
be carried out largely through HHS. 34
3. The Strategic National Stockpile
In order to provide medicines rapidly if there is a catastrophe,
whether natural or man-made, the CDC operates "12 'push packages'
of pharmaceutical and medical supplies and equipment strategically
located around the United States; additional lots of pharmaceuticals
and caches of medical materiel are maintained by manufacturers un-
der special contractual arrangements with CDC. 35 The proposal to
shift authority over this pharmaceutical stockpile to DHS is based on
the professed need to integrate it with other national emergency pre-
paredness and response assets at DHS. Under the proposal, "the Sec-
retary of [DHS] will assume responsibility for continued develop-
ment, maintenance, and deployment of the Stockpile - making it an
integral part of the larger suite of federal response assets managed by
FEMA and other future DHS components - while the Secretary of
HHS will continue to determine its contents. 36
C. Biological, Biomedical and Infectious Disease Defense Research
and Development
The President's proposal provides that, in regard to civilian hu-
man health-related biological, biomedical, and infectious disease de-
fense research and development, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
32 id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 id.
36 Id.
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in consultation with the Secretary of DHS, will have the authority to
establish the research and development program that will be imple-
mented through HHS. Thus, as the agency responsible for assessing
threats to the homeland, DHS, in consultation with the HHS Secre-
tary, will provide strategic direction regarding the nation's biological
and biomedical countermeasure research priorities.37 Moreover, while
if the DHS conducts or authorizes biological research it must collabo-
rate with HHS, it need not do it under HHS' supervision. The pro-
posal is silent on what happens if DHS and HHS are unable to arrive
at a joint strategic prioritization agreement or if DHS finds that re-
search designed by HHS does not ensure achievement of a joint
agreement.
38
In general, the issue here is whether it is feasible to separate au-
thority from responsibility, or to separate the officials charged with
administering those responsibilities from the personnel required to do
SO. 39  Some members of the biological research community have
voiced concerns that HHS, a scientific health agency, is best qualified
to prioritize and conduct federal research on human health-related
biological, biomedical, and infectious diseases, and to identify scien-
tific opportunities and research approaches for meeting biodefense
needs. 40 The response to bioterrorism will require the long-term dedi-
cation of financial resources and scientific talent; HHS/NIH has al-
ready demonstrated its capacity for such service.41 Transfer of pri-
mary responsibility for the prioritization and/or design of human bio-
defense research to DHS would create unpredictability for research
programs and would not be the optimum way to obtain the integrated
work of the best scientific minds, including the ability to rapidly mo-
bilize the scientific community with the appropriate expertise.42 Other
difficult questions arise, such as whether HHS would retain authority,
pursuant to the Public Health Service Act 43, to declare public health
emergencies or issue quarantines.
Perhaps the most important controversy here involves funding.
The President's proposal allocates to the DHS Secretary primary au-
37 See Testimony of W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, supra note 24 (stating need for
collaboration between agencies).
38 id.
39 id.
40 Am. Soc'y for Microbiology, ASM Testimony on Homeland Security, at
http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/homelandsecuritytest.htm (June 25, 2002) and Am.
Soc'y for Microbiology, at http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/liebermanltr.htm.
41 Am. Soc'y for Microbiology, at
http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/liebermanltr.htm.
42 id.
4' 42 U.S.C. § 264 (2002).
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thority over the $1.9 billion in NIH research grants relating to patho-
gens and countermeasures and the $1.5 billion in public health emer-
gency grants to state and local public health departments included in
recently enacted bioterrorism legislation. 44 A concern here is that
much of the terrorism-related research currently being performed
through NIH and CDC is dual-purpose in nature - serving the priori-
ties and needs of both counter terrorism and traditional public health.
Similarly, the grants to state and local public health departments and
hospitals are not just to prepare for the possibility of bioterrorism, but
for building up basic infrastructures such as surveillance and commu-
nication systems to improve response to all sorts of public health
emergencies, whether intentionally caused or naturally occurring.
A few specific provisions illustrate the controversy.
9 All research supported by funding appropriated to NIH for
bioterrorism research must be conducted under "joint strategic
prioritization agreements" with DHS.
e Regarding joint strategic prioritization agreements, the
DHS will have the authority to establish general research pri-
orities that will be embodied in the joint strategic prioritiza-
tion agreements. DHS need not consult with HHS in estab-
lishing priorities; it will have full authority to establish human
health-related bioterrorism research priorities.
* Once a joint strategic prioritization agreement is reached,
HHS should develop the specific scientific research agenda to
implement the agreement. However, HHS is expressly re-
quired to consult with DHS in setting the research agenda.
* DHS is permitted to transfer funds to HHS in connection
with joint strategic prioritization agreements, enabling it to
wield the power of the purse regarding bioterrorism re-
search.45
IV. RESTRICTIONS ON EXCHANGES, PUBLICATION
OF BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH INFORMATION
From a terrorist's perspective, culturing crude pathogens is not an
insurmountable barrier nor is obtaining rudimentary equipment for its
dissemination. But to make a truly catastrophic weapon, advanced
44 See Testimony of W.J. "Billy" Tauzin, supra note 24 (showing authority
over funding decisions to counter bioterror).
45 See Am. Soc'y for Microbiology, at
http://www.asmusa.org/pasrc/liebermanltr.htm.
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knowledge of biological science can be helpful if not essential. If the
goal is to create a weapon that is uniquely dangerous, access to recent
and cutting-edge research might be key to success. Thus, broad pub-
lication of the results of legitimate biological research activities might
enable a scientifically-sophisticated terrorist to develop new agents or
refine existing agents. New research could also enhance a terrorist's
ability to weaponize agents, either by rendering them capable of mass
dissemination, increasing the range of their applicability and effec-
tiveness, or rendering them less susceptible to immunization or treat-
ment. Accordingly, unfettered biological activity and communication
may provide opportunities for persons who would threaten our secu-
rity.
A policy to restrict the dissemination of scientific information,
however, raises serious objections. First, there is the basic issue of
freedom of speech, reinforced by scientists' strong belief that free
exchange of ideas is compulsory for progress. A second objection
relates to how information would be restricted. Classified research is
not at issue here; restrictions would be imposed upon the completion
of research that is otherwise in the public domain because of a gov-
ernment official's determination that the information is too dangerous
to be released. Notably, a scientist could spend considerable time and
professional resources in the pursuit of break-through information
which, upon reaching that goal, could be banned from publication,
with attendant consequences for his/her career. A third objection re-
lates to enforcing the restriction. Publication in a domestic journal
could, conceivably, be restricted, but it is far harder to prevent a report
from leaping to a foreign outlet or to the internet. Moreover, scientists
routinely exchange information through less monitorable communica-
tions at conferences and otherwise.
These objections notwithstanding, there is reason for con-
cern. According to George Poste, a leading expert on these ques-
tions:
Training in genetics, microbiology and biotechnology is now
offered in college courses around the world. Huge volumes
of information pertinent to bioterrorism are available in non-
classified scientific journals and on the internet. The number
of trained personnel capable of undertaking sophisticated ge-
netic manipulations has expanded substantially, including in
nations viewed as potential sponsors of terrorism. Techno-
logical advances allow the cultivation and harvesting of large
quantities of virulent micro-organisms virtually anywhere and
at minimal expense. A survey of 1,400 US academic institu-
tions revealed that 16% had stocks of pathogens listed in the
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draft Biological Weapons Convention, 11% had high-level
microbiological containment facilities and 3% had large vol-
ume bioreactors. Over 2000 new biotechnology companies
have been formed in the US and 1,500 in Europe during the
last 20 years, together with a parallel expansion of expertise
in genetics and molecular biology within the pharmaceutical
sector.46
A. Applicable Law
Current policy reflects the preference for unfettered dissemination
of information unless classified. National Security Decision Directive
189, formulated in 1985 and upheld last November by National Secu-
rity Advisor Condoleeza Rice as this administration's policy, estab-
lishes that research ought to remain as unrestricted as possible, and
that the only authorized way to restrict scientific information is
through classification; no research will be restricted unless it is classi-
fied. Specifically, the directive provides that:
[W]here the national security requires control, the mechanism
for control of information generated during federally-funded
fundamental research in science, technology and engineering
at colleges, universities and laboratories is classification.
Each federal government agency is responsible for: a) deter-
mining whether classification is appropriate prior to the award
of a research grant, contract, or cooperative agreement and, if
so, controlling the research results through standard classifica-
tion procedures; b) periodically reviewing all research grants,
contracts, or cooperative agreements for potential classifica-
tion. No restrictions may be placed upon conduct or reporting
of federally-funded fundamental research that has not re-
ceived national security classification.47
At this time, the following statutory provisions relate to the appli-
cability of the policy set forth in National Security Decision Directive
189:
46 George Poste, Biotechnology and Terrorism, at www.prospect-
magazine.co.uk...asp?acessibe=yes&pArticle=l 1341
47 NAT'L POLICY ON THE TRANSFER OF SCIENTIFIC, TECHNICAL AND
ENGINEERING INFORMATION, NAT'L SEC. DECISION DIRECTIVE No. 189, available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd- 1 89.htm (Sept. 21, 1985).
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* The Espionage and Sabotage Act of 1954 is designed to
prevent military secrets from being transmitted to foreign
agents.48 This statute could apply to biotechnology under a
broad interpretation of what constitutes "information relating
to the national defense., 49 A key element of an offense under
the act is proof of intentional dissemination of the information
with a desire to willfully harm the United States.50
e The Export Administration Act of 1979 allows control
of the nation's exports as necessary for national security.5
The Secretary of Commerce, acting with the Secretary of De-
fense, must establish a comprehensive list of all goods and
technologies that should be subject to export controls. The
regulations then require that to export such items requires the
grant of a license by the Secretary of Commerce.52
* Arms Export Act sets forth a list of materials that may
not be exported without a license. The Act encompasses
technologies that are both classified and unclassified; infor-
mation which is in the public domain is not included under
the Act.
D The US Patent System The Commissioner of the US Pat-
ent and Trademark Office has the power to initiate a process
whereby inventions that may be detrimental to the national
security may be kept secret, thereby obligating the applicant
to not disclose the invention to others. Failure to obey the or-
der results in abandonment of the patent application and in ex-
treme cases can result in a fine and imprisonment.
5 3
B. Recent Developments
The tension between the need to prevent widespread dissemina-
tion of potentially dangerous information and the need for scientific
freedom was recently highlighted by the publication in Scientific
48 18 U.S.C §§ 794, 2151, 2153-56 (2000).
49 James W. Parrett, Jr., A Proactive Solution to the Inherent Dangers of
Biotechnology: Using the Invention Secrecy Act to Restrict Disclosure of Threaten-
ing Biotechnology Patents, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 145, 159-60
(2001).
50 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2000) ("[w]hoever, with intent or reason to believe that it
is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation,
communicate ...")
51 Parrett, supra note 49, at 161.
52 id.
" Id. at 167-70.
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Magazine Online of July 11, 2002, of a paper , "Chemical Synthesis
of Poliovirus DNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of
Natural Template., 54 The paper presented a detailed description of
how to assemble a human polio virus by using DNA stretches ob-
tained by mail from a specialty reagent supplier.5 Nature Medicine
Magazine published another controversial study that pinpoints a muta-
tion in an influenza A virus gene that may explain the virulence of the
influenza outbreak in Hong Kong in 1997 6
Thus, what had been an abstract concern has suddenly become
demonstrably realistic, raising concerns that the public availability of
information might enhance threats to homeland security. Immediately
upon the publication of the polio paper, Representative Weldon along
with seven other members of Congress filed House Resolution 514,
criticizing the American Association for the Advancement of Science
("AAAS") 57 for having published what he described as "a blueprint
for creating a polio virus and other harmful pathogens that could be
released on the population of the United States. 58 The Resolution
called for the scientific community to develop ethical standards for
preventing published materials from aiding terrorists in the develop-
ment of agents of bioterrorism.5 9 Of far greater concern to the scien-
tific community, the Resolution instructed to the Executive Branch to
"examine all policies, including national security directives, relevant
to the classification or publication of federally funded research to en-
sure that, although the free exchange of information is encouraged,
information that could be useful in the development of chemical, bio-
logical, or nuclear weapons is not made accessible to terrorists or
countries of proliferation concem."
60
In response, members of the scientific community have asserted
that public dissemination of such controversial information spurs re-
search efforts, that the fear that information in such publications may
be abused is far outweighed by the benefits it may provide. "Many
microbiologists say that they see no threat to national security in the
54 Jeronimo Cello, Aniko V. Paul, Eckard Wimmer, Chemical Synthesis of
Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious Virus in the Absence of Natural Template,
at http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/1072266/DC 1.
55 id.
56 See Sang Heui Seo et al., Lethal HSN1 Influenza Viruses Escape Host
Anti-Viral Cytokine Responses, 8 NATURE MED. 950 (Sept. 2002), (explaining ex-
periments that detected a genetic mutation that makes the strain of influenza resistant
to regular anti-viral treatments) available at http://www.nature.com.
57 House Resolution 514
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 id.
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polio [case] because the DNA sequence [of the virus] is available over
the Internet and techniques for building [the virus] have long been
known.",61  Accordingly, the American Society for Microbiology
("ASM") has recently released guidelines for handling research manu-
scripts dealing with pathogenic agents that have potential bioterrorism
applications. 62 Primarily, the new guidelines ask all reviewers to ad-
vise their editors "if, in their opinion, the manuscript under review
describes misuses of microbiology or of information derived from
microbiology." A second question is if you are going to publish a
paper, should information be withheld to prevent that information
from being publicly available to terrorists. 63 If the answer to either
question is "yes", then "appropriate action will be taken in consulta-
tion with the Board of publication. '"64 The new policy allows the edi-
tors to serve as screeners who may block publication of any research
that may aid terrorists.
65
A committee of the National Research Council, the operating arm
of the National Academies is currently conducting a study which will:
9 Review current rules regulations and institutional ar-
rangements and processes in the US that provide oversight of
research on dangerous biological pathogens, including gov-
ernment laboratories, universities and other research institu-
tions and industry. The review will focus on how choices are
61 Jennifer Couzin, Bioterrorism: A Call for Restraint on Biological Data,
297 SCIENCEMAG 749 (Aug. 2, 2002), at
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/297/5582/749.
62 See Alan Dove & Karen Birmingham, Decisions to be Made on Biologi-
cally "Sensitive" Research, 8 NATURE MED. 905 (Sept. 2002) (discussing the debate
around whether scientific data related to possible bioterrorism agents should be sup-
pressed), available at http://www.nature.com/cgi-
taf/DynaPage.ta ffile=/nm/journal/v8/n9/full/nm0902-905.html.
63 Id.
64 id
65 Specifically, the ASM guidelines recognize that there are valid concerns
regarding the publication of information in scientific journals that could be out to
inappropriate use. Accordingly, members of the ASM Publications Board are advised
to evaluate any manuscript that might raise such issues during the review process.
Research articles must contain sufficient detail to permit the work to be repeated by
others. Editors of ASM journals should ask reviewers "if, in their opinion, the manu-
script under review describes misuses of microbiology or of information derived from
microbiology." In such a case, the manuscript should be examined by a broader
group of editors who will "determine whether to resume the review process or to
decline the manuscript and return it to the author." AM. SOC'Y FOR MICROBIOLOGY,
POLICY GUIDELINES OF THE PUBLICATIONS BOARD OF THE ASM IN THE HANDLING OF
MANUSCRIPTS DEALING WITH MICROBIOLOGICAL SENSITIVE ISSUES, at
http://journals.asm.org/misc/Pathogensand-toxins.shtml (last visited Nov. 3, 2002).
[Vol. 13:159
REGULATION OF BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH
made about which research is and is not appropriate, and how
information about relevant ongoing research is collected and
shared. It will consider the biosafety practices that govern the
conduct of research and the handling and transport of materi-
als.
* Use the review to assess the adequacy of current US rules,
regulations, and institutional arrangements and processes to
prevent the destructive application of dangerous biological
pathogens.
* Recommend changes in these practices that could im-
prove US capacity to prevent the destructive application of
dangerous biological pathogens while still enabling the con-
duct of legitimate research.
C. Recent Regulations Relating To International Exchanges of
Scientific Information
The free-flow of scientific information on an international scale
has been significantly affected by new government regulations. 66
Prior to September 11, 2001, scientific research laboratories could run
their labs with ease without "running afoul" of US export regula-
67tions. However, regulations currently under consideration could
narrow exemptions which facilitate the international exchange of sci-
entific information. According to Eugene Skolnikoff, professor of
political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, there is
a level of overreaction that is very likely to damage the "very security
we are trying to protect.1
68
1. Department of Agriculture Regulations
On April 12th, the Department of Agriculture (USDA), citing na-
tional security concerns, decided to exclude foreign scientists from its
laboratories. 69 Furthermore, it will no longer sponsor any visas for
foreign nationals. Non-citizens currently working in USDA laborato-
ries must either obtain permanent resident status or seek an alternate
visa sponsor when it comes time to renew. If circumstances preclude
66 See Peg Brickley, Staying One Step Ahead of Government Censors, THE
SCIENTIST, June 10, 2002, at 51 (discussing the narrowing of loopholes permitting
unrestricted international research), available at http://www.the-
scientist.com/yr2002/jun/prof-0206 10.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2002).
67 Id.
68 id.
69 Id.
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an individual from renewing their non-immigrant status, they must
return to where they came from.
2. State Department Regulations
On March 29th, the State Department revised the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"), narrowing an exemption al-
lowing for the free flow of information in the public domain. In par-
ticular, the new rules require that university researchers distinguish
between students from NATO countries or other friendly nations and
those who hail from unfriendly countries when discussing satellite-
related sciences.70  These regulations apply to foreign nationals lo-
cated both abroad and within the United States.71 In defense of the
changes to the ITAR, Norman Neureiter, science and technology ad-
visor to the Secretary of State stated that the ITAR is "munitions con-
trol.72
3. DOD Directives
A draft DOD directive would require that all US scientist work
only with overseas colleagues whose staff are comprised only of peo-
ple from NATO countries or other friendly nations, arousing fears that
new regulations will criminalize discussions that are currently com-
mon place on research campuses.73 The DOD directives may have an
impact on more than defense programs alone. It would essentially
require that all DOD-sponsored articles and presentations be submit-
ted to the military for review, effectively eliminating the research ex-
emption and substantially narrowing freedom of research.74
70 See 22 C.F.R § 123.16(b)(10)(iii) (2002) ("If the article(s) is for perma-
nent export, the platform or system in which the article(s) may be incorporated must
be a satellite covered by § 125.4(d)(l)(iii) of this subchapter and be exclusively con-
cerned with fundamental research and only be launched into space from countries and
by nationals of countries identified in this section."
71 International Traffic in Arms Regulations; Exemptions for U.S. Institu-
tions of Higher Learning, 67 Fed. Reg. 15099, 15100 (March 29, 2002), (to be codi-
fied at 22 C.F.R. § 123.16(b)(10)). These changes were never circulated outside of
the government as proposals before being published in the Federal Register on March
29.
72 "You're defining rules acceptable to the government relative to things that
are classified as munitions, and the government needs to define those rules." The
changes were years in the making, and "there will be things in the changes that uni-
versities might not like, but this was an interagency consensus." Brickley, supra note
66 at 52 (quoting Norman P. Neureiter), available at http://www.the-
scientist.com/yr2002/jun/prof 020610.html.
73 Id.
74 According to Robert Killoren, assistant vice president for research at
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4. Homeland Security Inquiry of OMB
The Office of Homeland Security has asked the Office of Man-
agement and Budget to develop new policy guidelines for so-called
"sensitive but unclassified" (SBU) information. The purpose of this
category is to preserve confidentiality without formal classification in
such a way as to permit the sharing of such sensitive information with
local law enforcement and emergency personnel who do not hold se-
curity clearances. 75 The scope of SBU information has not been de-
scribed, nor has the meaning "sensitive" been defined, prompting
concerns that it could function as a catch-all for whatever information
the increasingly secretive executive branch does not want to release.
V. CONCLUSION
Rightly or not, policy makers have reached the conclusion that bi-
ology is too dangerous to be left exclusively to the biologists. Al-
though the overwhelming majority of biological activities are wholly
innocent, the magnitude of harm caused by even a single misuse ar-
gues for the introduction of some protective measures. That must, of
course, be done in a rational and specifically tailored way, with sub-
stantial input from reputable scientists. Consideration must be given
to some restrictions on access to biological research activities as well
as some limitations on the distribution of information.
The initiatives discussed here are opening salvos in a controversy
that is likely to go on for an extended period. That they are so meas-
ured, avoiding extremes and over-reaction, is a positive sign as to the
ability of policy and scientific communities to work together to ad-
dress difficult issues. Depending on one's views on an array of stra-
tegic questions, one might favor more or less restriction, but no one
could seriously argue that these issues are not getting a fair hearing
nor that the proposed imposition of regulations is draconian.
There is one sense, however, in which this entire effort is decid-
edly lacking. Even where the choice to contain or restrict some scien-
tific activity seems clear, it is crucial to recognize the limitations of
doing so on a national basis. The United States can neither control the
global spread of bio-technology nor the transfer of information - a
truth that argues for an international approach. Much of the informa-
Pennsylvania State University, the directive would cover all DOD grants and con-
tracts including those pertaining to life sciences. Id.
75 Steven Aftergood, OMB Tackles Sensitive but Unclassified Information,
SECRECY NEWS (Sept. 3, 2002), at
http://www.fas.gov/sgp/news/secrecy/2002/O9/O90302.html.
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tion generated and many of the means of publication lie outside of the
United States and, therefore, is outside of domestic control. Any pro-
cedure that does not enlist support from the major scientific groups
outside the United States will be ineffective. The challenges raised
here are for the global community to resolve, and it is time for that
discussion to begin.
